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CONSCIOUSNESS , AN D TH E SOCIA L DEMOCRATI C PARTIE S 
By Nancy M.Wingfield 
In newly forme d Czechoslovakia , nationa l interest s played as large a role as class 
interest s in social democrati c politics . Th e two largest social democrati c parties , th e 
Czechoslova k and th e Germa n Social Democrats , bot h of which drew thei r suppor t 
mainl y from th e Bohemia n lands , inveighed against th e class biases of th e nonwor -
king-clas s partie s and condemne d one anothe r for exhibitin g th e same nationa l chauvi -
nism as the othe r politica l partie s of thei r respective nationality 1. Th e informa l alliance 
of th e larger social democrati c party , th e Czechoslova k Social Democrats , with th e 
Czec h Nationa l Socialists 2, a nationall y oriented , non-Marxis t party , exemplified th e 
1 Useful surveys of Czechoslova k interwar politics include : Bosl , Karl (ed.) : Die Erste 
Tschechoslowakisch e Republi k als multinationale r Parteienstaat . München-Wie n 1979. -
Mamatey , Victor S./Luža , Radomí r (eds.) : A Histor y of the Czechoslova k Republic , 
1918-1948. Princeton , 1973. -  P e r o u t k a , Ferdinand : Budován í státu; československá 
politika v letech popřevratovýc h [Building of the State : Czechoslova k Politic s in the First 
Postwar Years]. 5 vols. Prah a 1918-1936/38 . -  A lexander , Manfre d (ed.) : Deutsch e 
Gesandtschaftsbericht e aus Prag. Von der Staatsgründun g bis zum ersten Kabinet t Beneš 
1918-1921. Vol. 1. München - Wien 1983 and Kocman , Alois etal. (eds.) : Boj o směr vývoje 
československého státu [The Struggle for the Directio n of the Developmen t of the Czecho -
slovak State] . 2 vols. Prah a 1965-1969, includ e document s concernin g the division of the 
social democrati c partie s and the formatio n of the Czechoslova k Communis t Party . 
On the Czechoslova k Social Democrati c Party , see:Kárník , Zdeněk : Socialisté na rozce-
stí. Habsburg , Masaryk či Smeral? [The Socialists at the Corssroads . Habsburg , Masaryk or 
Šmeral?] . Prah a 1968. -  G a l a n d a u e r , Jan : Od Hainfeld u ke vzniku KSČ. České dělnické 
hnut í v letech 1889-1921 [Fro m Hainfel d to the Birth of the KSČ. The Czech Workers' 
Movemen t in the Year 1889-1921]. Prah a 1986. -  Czech-languag e literatuř e on the origins 
of the Communis t Part y is vast. Recen t work on the subject includes : M e j d r o v á, Hana : 
Komintern a a vznik KSČ [The Cominter n and the Birth of the KSČ] . In : Z českých a sloven-
ských dějin. Sborník [Fro m Czech and Slovák History . Collection] . Prah a 1982, 1-89. -
I d e m . : Komunistick á internacionál a a KSČ v letech 1921-1923 [The Communis t Interna -
tiona l and the KSČ in the Years 1921-1923]. In : Sborník historický . Studie-prameny -
diskuse-kritik a [Historica l Omnibus . Studies-Sources-Discussion-Criticism] . Prah a 1987. 
3-66. 
On the the Germa n Social Democrati c Part y of Czechoslovakia , seeZessner , Klaus: Josef 
Seliger und die national e Frage in Böhmen . Stuttgar t 1976 . -Wingf ie ld , Nanc y Meriwether : 
Minorit y Politic s in a Multinationa l State : the Germa n Social Democrat s in Czechoslovakia , 
1918-1938. Ne w York-Boulde r 1989. 
2 While there is no scholarly history of the Czechoslova k Nationa l Socialist Party , the follo-
wing literatuř e adresses different aspects of that party's politics: B randes , Detlef : Die 
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Situatio n in which conflictin g nationa l interest s sometime s overshadowe d th e shared 
class interest s of these parties . Th e division of th e respective social democrati c partie s 
int o left and right wings durin g th e immediat e postwar period , however , was as 
dependen t on th e politic s of th e local part y leader s and specific local condition s as on 
th e traditiona l radicalism of different occupationa l group s or on thei r level of class 
consciousness . Moreover , in th e čase of th e Germa n Social Democrat s (th e DSAP) , 
suppor t for th e internationalis t policie s of th e left-win g social democrat s and later th e 
communist s reflected particula r grievances against th e nationa l structur e of th e new 
statě , as well as against its socio-politica l form . Thi s initia l "protest " suppor t did no t 
necessaril y translat e int o eithe r part y membershi p or long-ter m support , particularl y 
when it becam e clear tha t th e far left paid little mor e tha n lip service to Germa n grie-
vances. 
Despit e th e importan t role nationalit y conflic t played in th e politic s of th e Firs t 
Republic , mos t Czech s and German s were relatively isolated from on e another . Th e 
attitude s of bot h group s tende d to be based on th e unrepresentativ e types the y had 
traditionall y encountered : in th e Germa n čase, poo r Czec h and Slovák migran t labo-
rers; in th e Czec h čase, petty-minde d Germa n bureaucrats , who seldom kne w a word 
of Cpech 3. Although tensio n in th e nationall y mixed areas affected everyone , ethni c 
aggravation probabl y played a greater role in th e daily life of the German s tha n of th e 
Czechs , because multinationa l Czechoslovaki a was explicitly constitute d as a nationa l 
statě of " Czechoslovak s "., Thus , th e German s were regularly reminde d of thei r mino -
rity statu s and of thei r loss of politica l power as a nationa l group in Czechoslovaki a as 
compare d to tha t in th e vanished Austria-Hungary . Th e Situatio n was in man y ways a 
reversal of th e positio n of th e two group s unde r th e Habsbur g Monarchy . 
Although historicall y th e Czec h and Germa n people s living in th e borde r district s 
of th e forme r crownland s had intermingled , for th e mos t part , unti l th e nineteent h 
Century , th e Czech s had remaine d in thei r traditiona l home , th e fertile heartlan d of 
Bohemia-Moravia . When the y first began movin g int o industrializin g Germa n areas 
ofthecrownlandsinsearchofemploymentduringtheearlyandmid-nineteent h Century , 
man y of the m becam e Germanized . Thos e Comin g in th e secon d half of th e Century , 
however , had a growing sense of nationa l identit y and a highe r birthrat e tha n thei r 
Germa n counterparts , factor s which inflame d nationa l rivalries. Migratin g Czech s 
tschechoslowakische n National-Sozialisten . In : Bosl (ed.) : Die Erste Tschechoslowa -
kische Republi k als multinationale r Parteienstaat , 101-153. -  H a r n a , Josef: Kritika ideo-
lo gie a pogramu českého národníh o socialismu [Critica l Ideology and the Program of Czech 
Nationa l Socialism] . Prah a 1978. -  Havlasová , Marie : Vznik, počátk y a profil národn ě 
sociální strany. K dějinám českých politických stran v druh é polovině 19. a začátkem 20. sto-
letí [The Birth , Beginning, and Profile of the Nationa l Socialist Party . On the Histor y of the 
Czech Politica l Partie s in the Second Half of the 19th Centur y and the Beginnin g of the 20th 
Century] . ActaUC , Studia Historic a 25/3 (1982) 95-115. 
On how little the two groups knew each other , see Kern , Karl Richard : Heima t und Exil -
von Böhme n nach Schweden : Erinnerunge n und Bekenntniss e eines sudetendeutsche n 
Sozialdemokraten . Nürnber g 1980, 87. -  For a Germa n characterizatio n of the Czechs , see 
F r a n z e l , Emil : Gegen den Wind der Zeit : Erinnerunge n eines Unbequemen . Münche n 
1983, 14. 
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primaril y moved int o unskilled occupations . As th e nee d for highly skilled labor 
decrease d due to change s in th e method s of productio n an d to increase d industria l 
concentration , th e less skilled Czec h workers began to relace th e Germa n maste r 
craftsme n who commande d higher salaries. Particularl y th e German s of northwester n 
Bohemi a felt th e competitio n of th e Czechs , who , ušed to a lower standar d of living, 
accepte d lower wages. Althoug h Czech s and German s labore d side by side in facto-
ries, th e managemen t and ownershi p were almos t exclusively German 4 . 
Th e growth of Czec h nationa l consciousnes s parallele d th e growth of th e nascen t 
socialist movement . Although th e Austrian Social Democrati c Party 5 was reorganize d 
on a federal basis in 1897, and th e Brun n Part y Congres s of 1899 adopte d a nationalit y 
progra m advocatin g th e reorganizatio n of Cisleithani a as a federal statě of nationali -
ties, th e Czechs , th e secon d largest nationa l group in th e party , still felt threatene d by 
what the y regarde d as th e centralizing , Germanizin g tendencie s of Vienna . The y also 
objecte d to continue d Germa n dominatio n of th e uppe r echelon s of th e party . Austro-
Germa n Social Democrats , however , did no t conside r bureaucrati c centralization , 
which the y supported , a threa t to th e othe r nationalities . Mor e importantly , the y were 
no t prepare d to yield thei r dominan t positio n  6 . 
Th e conflictin g demand s of th e German s for centralizatio n and th e Czech s for auto -
nom y within th e part y tested Austrian Social Democrati c flexibility, particularl y after 
the expansio n of th e franchis e in 1897 and 1907, which facilitate d th e growth of mass 
politicalparties,asAustriamovedtowardlimiteddemocracy.Theotherpoliticalpartie s 
of Cisleithani a were divided alon g nationa l lineš, and with th e expansio n of th e fran-
chise, the y began to mak e nationalis t overture s to th e workin g class. Th e social demo -
crat s were onl y partiall y successful in combattin g these appeal s to thei r constituency . 
Social democrati c policy on th e nationalit y questio n alienate d bot h Czec h and Ger -
ma n workers in th e ethnicall y mixed region s of Bohemia : precept s of internationa l 
solidarit y and class struggle held little appea l for workers faced with what the y consi -
dered a battl e for thei r nationa l survival. Furthermore , th e varied nationa l demand s of 
th e Czec h and Germa n Socia l Democrat s sometime s conflicted . No r did the y always 
agree with Vienna' s respons e to thei r demands : for example , th e refusal of th e part y 
cente r in 1901 to provid e funds for a Czech-languag e social democrati c newspape r for 
th e Czech-speakin g worker s of Vienna outragé d th e Czec h Socia l Democrats . 
4 On economic-nationa l friction amon g the Czech s and the German s in the border regions 
durin g the latě nineteent h Century , see W h i t e s i d e, Andrew Gladding : Austrian Nationa l 
Socialism Before 1918. The Hague 1962. -  Ibid. : The Deutsch e Arbeiterpartei . Austrian 
Histor y Newslette r 4 (1963) 3-14. - I b i d . : Industria l Transformation , Populatio n Move-
men t and Germa n Nationalis m in Bohemia . Zeitschrif t für Ostforschun g 2 (1961) 261-71. 
5 Fo r a history of the Austrian Social Democrati c Party , see Ludwig B r ü g e 1' s exhaustive 
study: Geschicht e der österreichische n Sozialdemokratie . 5 vols. Wien 1922-1925. -  See also 
K o n r a d , Helmut : Nationalismu s und Internationalismus : Die österreichisch e Arbeiter-
bewegung vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Wien 1976. -  The best discussion of Austrian Social 
Democrac y and the nationalit y question remain s M o m m s e n , Hans : Die Sozialdemokrati e 
und die Nationalitätenfrag e im habsburgische n Vielvölkerstaat. Wien 1963. 
6 On theattitude s of the Austro-Germa n party leaders, see Rab i n bach , Anton : The Crisis 
of Austrian Socialism: From Red Vienna to Civil War, 1927-1934. Chicago 1983, 16-18. 
7 W h e a t o n , Bernard : Radica l Socialism in Czechoslovakia : Bohumí r Smeral , the Czech 
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Th e greatest challeng e on th e Germa n side cam e from th e Germa n Workers ' Part y 
(Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, th e DAP) , centere d in norther n Bohemia , th e majorit y of 
whose leader s and member s were workers. Founde d in 1903 in Aussig (Úst í nad 
Labem) , a region of pronounce d Czech-Germa n nationa l rivalries, the DA P drew the 
bulk of its membershi p from forme r social democrat s disgruntle d with thei r party' s 
failure to oppos e th e flow of Czech s int o German-inhabite d areas. Th e DAP , rejectin g 
th e concep t of internationa l solidarity , claime d tha t Germa n workers could realize 
thei r "füll potential " onl y within thei r own nationality 8. 
Muc h of th e working-clas s suppor t for th e Czec h Nationa l Socialist Party , founde d 
in 1897 by Václav Klofáč , was th e result of social democrati c failure to deal effectively 
with th e nationalit y problém . Although conceive d as a workers' s party , man y of its 
member s in fact cam e from th e rank s of th e peti t bourgeoisie . Th e part y rejected th e 
social democrati c doctrin e of proletaria n internationalism , and called instea d for a 
Czec h fron t to fight for th e remova l of "foreign" [German ] influenc e from the Bohe -
mian lands . Czec h Nationa l Socialist s advocate d Bohemia n State s rights, and th e 
allure of th e party' s nationalis t message for Czec h workers was apparen t in its gains at 
th e expense of th e Czec h Social Democrat s in the 1901 Reichsrat h elections . 
Czech-Germa n Social Democrati c friction was temporaril y laid to rest at the out -
break of World War I when th e social democrat s of Cisleithani a followed th e policy of 
Burgfrieden up to th e winte r of 1917-1918. A small anti-wa r group aroun d Friedric h 
Adler emerged as early as th e autum n of 1914, but it remaine d weak unti l late in th e 
war. Opponent s to Kriegsmarxismus gained strengt h onl y when part y leader Ott o 
Bauer returne d from a Russian prisoner-of-wa r cam p in late 1917 and too k over 
leadershi p of th e anti-wa r left. H e began developin g th e idea of complet e self-determi -
natio n of all people s in th e Monarchy . In Januar y 1918, th e Austrian Social Democrat s 
announce d a nationalit y progra m recognizin g th e right of non-German s to self-deter -
minatio n and demandin g th e same for th e German s of Austria 9. 
Ther e was little unres t in the Monarch y durin g th e war. Demonstration s through -
ou t 1917 and muc h of 1918 were sparked mor e by shrinkin g food ration s tha n by 
revolutionar y fervor. While on e of th e objectives of th e Czec h Social Democrat s and 
Czec h Nationa l Socialist s in organizin g th e 14 Octobe r 1918 strike was to get th e jump 
on th e Národní výbor, which was middl e class in its outlook , Czec h demonstration s 
also had clear nationa l overtones . The y were as muc h directe d against th e expor t of 
Bohemia n foodstuffs to Vienna and for nationa l independenc e as toward socialist 
goals. Th e Bohemia n crownland s saw little revolutionar y activity at the war's end . 
Togethe r with Slovakia and Ruthenia , long integra l part s of th e Kingdo m of Hungary , 
the y becam e par t of newly create d Czechoslovakia . Thi s successor statě experience d a 
Road to Socialism and the Origins of the Czechoslova k Communis t Part y (1917-1921) . New 
York-Boulde r 1986, 38. 
8 On the DAP , see: Tu tsch , Erich : Die Deutsch e Arbeiterpartei , Deutsch e Nationalsoziali -
stische Arbeiterparte i DAP-DSA P 1903-1933 (Diplomarbeit , Universitä t Münche n 1984). -
W h i t e s i d e , Andrew Gladding : The Deutsch e Arbeiterpartei , 1904-1918: A Contributio n 
to the Origins of Fascism . Austrian Histor y Newslette r 4 (1963) 3-14. 
Kann , Rober t A.: The Multi-Nationa l Empire : Nationalis m and Nationa l Reform in the 
Habsbur g Monarchy , 1848-1918. 2 vols. New York 1950, 2: 175-176. 
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democratic , nationa l transformatio n as power passed peacefull y from th e Austrian 
governmen t int o th e hand s of th e Czechoslova k Nationa l Counci l durin g th e closing 
days of th e war. Agrarian and Nationalis t Socialist politician s held key position s in th e 
Council . 
Ther e had been dissension amon g th e Czec h Social Democrat s durin g th e last years 
of th e war when men who stressed national-politica l goals were elected to th e execu-
tive committee , promptin g part y chairma n Bohumí r Šmera l to resign in Octobe r 
191710. These difference s were, however , temporaril y eclipsed by th e creatio n of an 
independen t Czechoslova k statě in Octobe r 1918. Czec h Social Democrat s participa -
ting in th e constituen t Nationa l Assembly joined politician s from non-workin g class 
partie s in fashionin g the new state' s provisiona l Constitutio n and government . 
Contemporar y report s suggest tha t in th e immediat e postwar period , th e majorit y 
of th e Czec h and Germa n Socia l Democrati c leadershi p neithe r expecte d no r wante d 
a revolutio n following th e Russian example 11. Germa n Social Democrat s were 
concerne d with joinin g th e newly create d German-Austria , while Czec h Social 
Democrat s rejected these asprirations , assertin g tha t "legitimate " Germa n claims 
were me t by Czechoslova k complianc e with th e minorit y treat y signed at St. Ger -
main in 1919. 
Th e Germa n member s of th e forme r Austrian Social Democrati c regiona l organiza -
tion s in th e crownland s had becom e reluctan t Citizen s of a countr y with border s based 
on economic , geographic , historie , and strategie claims, rathe r tha n on th e right to 
self-determination . As th e Czech s of Bohemia , Moravia , and Silesia celebrate d thei r 
"liberation " from th e Monarchy , thei r Germa n neighbor s demonstrate d to protes t thei r 
inclusio n in Czechoslovakia . Czec h soldiers began occupyin g th e Germa n borde r 
regions in Novembe r to unit ě the m with th e rest of th e countr y and to strengthe n 
Czec h territoria l claims at th e peace Conference . Tensio n between th e Czech s and th e 
German s erupte d int o violence on 4 Marc h 1919 durin g demonstration s throughou t 
th e German-populate d region s led by th e Germa n Social Democrat s to protes t Pra -
gue's refusal to permi t Germa n participatio n in th e German-Austria n parliamentar y 
elections . Thes e demonstration s were broke n up by th e Czec h military , resultin g in 
54 deaths , and providin g Germa n nationalist s with a rallying poin t tha t the y would use 
throughou t th e interwa r period . 
In additio n to interpart y nationalis t tensions , politica l problem s were developin g 
On Bohumí r Šmeral , see Ga l an d au er , Jan : Bohumí r Šmeral , 1880-1914. Prah a 1981. -
Ide m : Bohumí r Šmeral , 1914-1941. Prah a 1986. -  Whea to n : Radica l Socialism. -  For 
the prewar backgroun d on Czech Social Democrati c differences, see G a l a n d a u e r : Boh-
umír Šmeral , 1880-1914. -  U r b a n , Otto : Bohumí r Šmeral a Františe k Modráče k jako 
představitel é dvou ideologických linií v české sociální demokraci i před první světovou válkou 
[Bohumí r Šmeral and Františe k Modráče k as Representative s of Two Ideologica l Direction s 
in Czech Social Democrac y Before the First World War]. ČsČH 13 (1965) 432-444. 
See document s in Kocma n et al. (eds.) : Boj o směr 1: 70-72. -  Speeche s by Františe k 
Modráče k and othe r Czechoslova k Social Democrat s in Protoko l XII . sjezdu českosloven-
ského sociálně demokratick é strany dělnické [Protoco l of the XII Congress of the Czechos -
lovak Social Democrati c Workers' Party] . Prah a [ 1919]. -  Numerou s articles in the Novem -
ber and Decembe r 1918 edition s of Právo lidu. 
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within bot h social democrati c parties . Th e Germa n Socia l Democrati c left was cente -
red in Reichenber g (Liberec) , on e of th e largest critie s in German-speakin g Bohemia . 
Economicall y and politicall y important , Reichenber g and th e small industria l villages 
adjacen t to it were a traditiona l cente r of th e Bohemia n Germa n workers ' movement . 
A left wing began to develop amon g th e Czec h Social Democrat s soon after thei r 
fusion with th e Slovák Social Democrat s in Decembe r 1918 to form th e Czechoslova k 
Social Democrati c Party . Th e left wing was neithe r concentrate d in on e geographi c 
area , no r was its leadershi p ideologicall y unified . In addition , some Czec h Social 
Democrat s who had been par t of th e pacifist left durin g th e war moved to th e nationa -
list right wing of th e part y at th e war's end . Th e textile factorie s of Brun n (Brno) , th e 
mine š of Kladno , and th e industria l suburb s of Pragu e provide d th e Czec h left with 
muc h of its leadershi p and support . N o t onl y th e left wing within th e party , led by 
Šmera l and Journalis t Josef Skalák, but also othe r groups , representin g a variety of left-
wing views, influence d th e Czec h left. Ther e were anarchist s and splinte r communis t 
parties , on e of which had been founde d in Russia durin g th e war by Czec h prisoner s 
heade d by th e Czec h Social Democra t Alois Mun a of Kladno , later a leader of th e 
social-democrati c left wing. 
Th e communa l election s of Jun e 1919, Czechoslovakia' s first, resulte d in victorie s 
for bot h th e Czechoslova k and Germa n Socia l Democrats . Suppor t for th e two partie s 
was stronges t in Bohemia , where th e Czechoslova k Social Democrat s won one-thir d 
and th e Germa n Social Democrat s one-hal f of th e votes cast by th e member s of thei r 
respective nationalities . Th e continuin g antagonis m between th e Germa n and the 
Czechoslova k Social Democrat s was reflected in th e former' s decision to coupl e lists 
with othe r Germa n partie s in ethnicall y mixed areas to maintai n Germa n majoritie s in 
th e town Councils 12. Th e victory of th e DSA P was as muc h a reflectio n of th e disarra y 
of th e othe r politica l partie s as of its own strength . 
Soon afterward , in August 1919, th e Germa n Social Democrat s held thei r foundin g 
congress . The y rejected radicalism in nationa l an d social questions , supporte d th e 
democrati c republic , and oppose d governmen t by worker Councils . However , part y 
chairma n Josef Seliger still called for extensive autonom y for Czechoslovakia' s natio -
nal minorities 13. Th e part y progra m was importan t because in only ten months , by 
acceptin g th e status quo, th e DSA P had moved from demandin g Separatio n from 
Czechoslovaki a to recognitio n of th e statě and calling for autonom y within it 1 4 -  a 
deman d th e part y would maintai n throughou t th e existence of th e Firs t Republic . Al-
thoug h th e growing tension s within th e part y were swept unde r th e rug, ther e was 
some indicatio n of futur e problems . Emi l Strauss , a part y jounalis t and Seliger's son-
in-law , attacke d Kar l Kreibic h -  who supporte d left-win g social democrat s elsewhere 
and mad e no secret of his sympath y for th e fledgling Soviet goverrimen t -  for using his 
positio n as edito r of th e part y pape r Vorwärts to voice his opinions l 5 . 
Vorwärts (Reichenberg ) 13 May 1919. -  Freihei t (Teplitz ) 17 May 1919. 
Protokol l des Parteitage s (DSAP ) Teplitz , 1919. 
Z e s s n e r: Josef Seliger 116. 
See, for example, Vorwärts (Reichenberg ) 2 Septembe r 1919. 
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While the Czechoslovak Social Democrats accepted the theoretical portion of the 
DSAP's program, they rejected the notion of autonomy for the national minorities, 
characterizing Seliger's demand for the creation of an autonomous German region as 
something the German nationalist newspaper Bohemia would happily endorse. 
Moreover, Czechoslovak Social Democrats noted that the German Social Democrats 
were now demanding the same autonomy in Czechoslovakia that they had opposed 
granting the Czechs in the Monarchy. Their demands would be judged accordingly16. 
The Czechoslovak Social Democrats were united only in their Opposition to Ger-
man Social Democratic demands for autonomy. Complaints from the left wing 
became more vociferous with the formation of the second Czechoslovak government 
by party leader Vlastimil Tusar in July 1919. The Czechoslovak Social Democratic left 
as well as the DSAP attacked the right wing Czechoslovak Social Democrats both for 
governing with bourgeois parties and for their foreign policy. The party leadership 
had supported the anti-Bolshevik activities of the victorious powers, opposed Béla 
Kun's Hungarian Soviet Republic, and aided by Allied troops had toppled the fledgling 
Slovák Soviet Republic. Czechoslovak Social Democratic coalition participants at-
tempted to differentiate party goals from those of the governing coalition, noting 
that the party had to compromise on some of its socialist demands in order to assure the 
continued existence of the coalition. To be sure, the Tusar government had achieved 
some long-desired social democratic goals by enacting laws concerning child labor, 
land reform, and unemployment. 
Disenchanted Czechoslovak Social Democrats formed an autonomous Organiza-
tion, the Marxist Left, in December 1919. The Marxist Left opposed continued parti-
cipation in the government, demanding the recall of all social democratic ministers. 
They also demanded the development of joint policies with the minority Social Demo-
cratic Parties, the dictatorship of the Proletariat, and membership in the Third Inter-
national. Members of the Marxist Left claimed that the decision in December 1918 to 
participate in the government had been limited to the provisional National Assembly 
and the writing of the Constitution. This period passed with the first parliamentary 
elections in April 1920. When, over the protests of the Marxist Left, the right-wing 
Czechoslovak Social Democrats chose to participate in the country's first representa-
tive government, 24 deputies and 5 Senators from the Marxist Left announced their 
Opposition to participation in the coalition. They argued that the national, bourgeois 
revolution that led to the formation of Czechoslovakia must develop into a social 
revolution, which would come through struggle against the bourgeois parties, rather 
than through Cooperation with them: it was an ideological contradiction both to 
admire the tenets of the Bolshevik Revolution and to support the Czechoslovak 
government with its anti-Bolshevik policies. 
German Social Democrats had initially welcomed the Marxist Left as a step toward 
the creation of a supranational social democratic party in Czechoslovakia. Later they 
became more cautious. Some DSAP members argued that nationalist feeling among 
the Czechoslovak Social Democrats ran so high that an "International" in Czechoslo-
Left-wing Czechoslovak Social Democrat Václav Vacek in Právo lidu 2 September 1919. 
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vakia could no t be realized soon . Ad additiona l reason for cautio n was th e possible 
effect of th e Marxis t Lefťs demand s on th e increasingl y restive left wing of the DSAP . 
Indeed , Germa n Social Democrat s from Reichenber g had greeted th e Marxis t Lefťs 
manifest o with enthusiasm , thoug h notin g tha t it did no t directl y addres s th e natio -
nalit y question . Ther e was good reason for DSA P suspicion of nationalis t f eeling with-
in th e Marxis t Left. Th e desire to preserve th e statě tende d to defuse radicalism . Fo r 
example , Czechoslova k Social Democrati c Journalis t Josef Stivín, whose commitmen t 
to revolutio n had been rewarde d with honorár y membershi p in th e Soviet Hungaria n 
government , renounce d Šmera l when revolutionar y problem s in Slovakia pu t th e 
republic' s continue d existence in doubt 1 7 . 
Although th e DSA P was th e thir d mos t populä r part y in th e Republic , no real con -
sideratio n was given on eithe r side to its participatio n in th e coalition . Nationalis t fee-
lings ran to o high for th e Czech s to offer th e German s a share in governin g what the y 
regarde d as "their " republic , no r were th e German s prepare d to play secon d fiddle to 
th e Czechoslova k Social Democrat s in coalitio n politics . Indeed , th e Czechoslova k 
Social Democrati c attitud e towar d thei r Germa n fellow Citizen s appear s to have been 
merel y on e of toleration . Stivín, who becam e on e of th e leader s of th e party' s right 
wing, spoke for man y of his comrade s when , at a meetin g of the Czechoslova k Social 
Democrati c right wing on th e secon d anniversar y of th e republic , he commente d 
that : 
our Republi c has three-and-one-hal f million Germans , who are represente d by a large numbe r 
of deputie s in the Nationa l Assembly, but I thin k we would be bette r off if we had a million fewer 
[Germans] . However , in the end, we are stuck with the Germans , we should work with them 
hand in hand , mainly the workers18. 
Th e politica l unres t tha t characterize d postwar Centra l Europ e was evident in 
Czechoslovaki a durin g th e spring of 1920. Th e Czechoslova k Socia l Democrats , who 
dominate d th e governmen t coalition , were faced with th e spectacl e of Marxis t left 
leader Muna , nominall y on e of thei r own, tried for high treason . In addition , ther e 
was worker unrest : strikes for higher wages and protest s over food shortages , as well 
as scattere d demand s for revolution . When Pragu e remaine d studiousl y neutra l in th e 
Polish-Sovie t War of 1920, social democrati c rail worker s prevente d th e shipmen t of 
Allied armament s from Austria to Poland . Social democrat s staged anti-wa r rallies ' 9 , 
and th e DSA P and th e Marxis t Left berate d th e governmen t for its failure to suppor t 
the Soviet "workers"' statě against th e Polish "bourgeois" statě . 
Thre e decisive and relate d events occurre d in mid-Septembe r 1920: th e postpone -
men t of th e Czechoslova k Social Democrati c Part y congress , th e fall of the Tusa r 
government , and th e oceupatio n of th e part y headquarter s by th e Marxis t Left. Follo -
W h e a t on : Radica l Socialism 50, citing Právo lidu 7 Jun e 1919. 
Státn í ústředn í archiv Prah a [State Centra l Archive Prague] , heraf ter, SÚA, presidium policej -
ního ředitelství [Hea d of Police Administration] , hereafte r PP , 1916-20, sign. P/54/3 , c. j . 
13017/20. 
See SÚA, předsednictv o ministersk é rady [Directorat e of the Counci l of Ministers] , hereafte r 
PMR , carto n 3189, sign. 704/11 zprávy o schůzích politických stran v Čechác h [Report s on 
the Meetin g of the Politica l Partie s in Bohemia] , for report s of DSAP and social-democrati c 
youth Organizatio n protes t meeting s in Krumau , Kaaden , Karlsbad, and Reichenberg . 
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wing a series of Marxis t Left Conferences , th e Czechoslova k Social Democrati c right 
wing, preparin g for a likely part y split, moved to salvage what it could of th e origina l 
party . O n 14 September , by a vote of 39 to 18, th e part y executi v postpone d th e 
comin g congress , claimin g tha t th e Marxis t Left, influence d by Moscow , was secretly 
tryin g to build a communis t Organizatio n within th e party . Th e following day th e Tusa r 
governmen t resigned , an event precipitate d by bot h foreign and domesti c problems . 
Infuriate d by th e preemptiv e actio n of th e part y executive , th e Marxis t Left rejected 
th e postponemen t of th e congress , held it as planned , and attracte d some two-third s 
of th e origina l delegates . Claimin g to be th e tru e representativ e of th e party , th e 
Marxis t Left too k possession of th e part y press, its treasury , and th e headquarter s at 
Lidový dum. Bot h th e headquarter s and th e press were legally owned by right-wing 
leader s of th e party , however , and the y went to cour t to preven t publicatio n of Právo 
lidu by th e Marxis t Left and to force th e retur n of Lidový dům. O n 1 October , th e 
part y executive retaliate d by expelling fifteen member s of th e Marxis t Left, includin g 
Mun a and Šmeral . Th e part y executive condemne d th e appropriatio n of part y pro -
pen y as a breac h of disciplině . Th e Marxis t Left considere d th e postponemen t of th e 
part y congres s a Diktat by th e minorit y and attacke d th e part y executive committee' s 
recours e to legal actio n regardin g th e part y headquarters . 
At th e same time , th e DSA P was holdin g its secon d part y congres s in Karlsbad , 
where increasin g interna l conflic t was th e main topi č of discussion . Dissensio n was 
bot h regiona l and generational : Oppositio n leader s were ten to twent y years younge r 
tha n othe r DSA P leaders . Seliger spoke for th e majorit y and Kreibic h for th e Opposi -
tion . Kreibic h too k th e positio n tha t in a multinationa l statě like Czechoslovakia , 
seizure of power by th e Proletaria t could succeed only if proletarian s of all nation s 
were united . Advocatin g on e of th e mos t radica l politica l program s of th e time , he 
argued tha t th e next battl e shoul d be for th e destructio n of th e bourgeoi s statě rathe r tha n 
for nationa l autonomy . Implicitn í Kreibich'sprogra m was theassumptionthatnationa -
lity problem s would someho w be resolved in th e "natural " cours e of events following 
the revolution . Seliger, on th e contrary , argued tha t th e method s employe d in th e class 
struggle depende d on development s in each country , and tha t in any čase, social 
democrati c partie s were obliged to win th e majorit y over to socialism, because dictator -
ship in th e sense of th e Communist Manifesto mean t dictatorshi p of th e majority 20. 
A short-live d compromise , which was no t really muc h of a compromis e at all, was 
adopted : th e onl y concessio n to part y dissident s was a provision allowing the m to 
express thei r views. Kreibic h was conten t to remai n in th e part y for th e tim e being. H e 
believed tha t lopsided acceptanc e of th e compromis e was no t an accurat e reflectio n of 
part y sentiment , because onl y a minorit y of delegates had actuall y been elected by 
part y members . Th e other s had been appointe d by trad e unio n and part y officials. 
Part y unit y was destroye d thre e weeks later when th e Reichenberger s declare d tha t th e 
onl y significance th e Karlsbad compromis e held for the m was th e provision for furthe r 
activity within th e part y on behal f of th e Thir d International . Thus , the y maneuvere d 
to win as man y part y member s as possible over thei r poin t of view21. 
20 Protokol l des Parteitage s (DSAP) ! Karlsbad, 1920, pp. 287-391. 
21 Chairma n Seliger died shortly after the Karlsbad Congress . Deput y chairma n Ludwig 
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Th e question s tha t th e social democrati c partie s debate d -  workers ' Councils , 
method s of class struggle, an d membershi p in th e Thir d Internationa l -  were also th e 
subject of discussion by thei r affiliated yout h groups . At congresses in th e autum n of 
1920, representative s of bot h th e Czec h and th e Germa n Socia l Democrati c yout h 
voted overwhelmingl y to join th e Communis t Youth International . These socialist 
yout h group s becam e th e first social democrati c organization s to mak e th e division 
within th e part y final 22. 
Thi s occurre d in a contex t of sporadi c Czech-Germa n conflic t and anti-Semiti c 
outbursts . O n 15 November , German s in th e borde r town of Eger (Cheb ) responde d 
to th e pullin g down of statue s of Josef I I by Czec h legionaire s in town Square s in Eger 
and Teplit z (Teplice ) by replacin g th e statu e in Eger after paintin g it Germa n black, 
red , an d gold 23, and damagin g th e Czec h schoo l there . Attacks on Czec h Citizen s and 
soldiers were also reported . Thi s resulte d in Czec h nationalist-le d demonstration s in 
Pragu e on 16 November . Germa n resident s of th e capita l were beaten , Germa n 
communa l and universit y buildin g occupied , Germa n and Jewish stores damaged , and 
Jewish communa l record s in th e Jewish town hall in th e forme r ghett o destroyed 2 4. 
Ther e were report s of Czech s runnin g down Meiselgasse in th e ghett o shoutin g 
"Strin g up any Germa n or Jew on th e next lamp post 2 5 . " 
Czec h reactio n was mixed . While some chauvinists , includin g th e Czec h Nationa l 
Democrat s and Nationa l Socialists , blame d th e German s for th e uproar , bot h th e 
left -  and right-win g - Czechoslova k Social Democrati c leader s condemne d th e 
demonstrators . 
As th e excitemen t was dying down , th e Marxis t Left called a generá l strike on 10 
December , in respons e to police attempt s th e previou s evenin g to remov e the m from 
th e part y headquarter s in Prague , which the y still occupied . Th e Czechoslova k Socia l 
Democrati c right,  with a cour t orde r giving it possession of th e building , relied on th e 
police for th e retur n of th e part y headquarters . Resistanc e to police efforts to clear th e 
buildin g resulte d in bloodshed , and althoug h th e numbe r of injured is unknown , it does 
no t appea r to have been th e "massacre " Czechoslova k communist s later claimed . Th e 
Marxis t Left publishe d an eight-poin t proclamatio n demandin g th e remova l of police 
from th e headquarter s an d its retur n to th e workers, as well as th e release of thos e 
arreste d in th e previou s nighťs fracas. No t all of th e demand s were specifically 
Marxist ; the y expressed rathe r th e heterogeneou s natur e of th e leadershi p of th e 
Marxis t Left as well as its attemp t to appea l to th e widest possible audienc e for support . 
Smícho v un d Libeň , two industria l suburb s of Prague , as well als Brunn , Kladno , 
Czech , long-tim e leader of the Germa n Social Democrat s in Brunn , but a relative unknow n 
in Bohemia , succeeded him. 
On the split tha t was occurin g in the social democrati c trade union s at this time , see D u b -
ský, Vladimír: KSČ a odborové hnut í v Československu na počátk u dvacátých let [The 
KSČ and the Trade-Unio n Movemen t at the Beginnin g of the 1920s]. Prah a 1966. -
M c D e r m o t t , Kevin: The Czech Red Unions , 1918-1929: A Study of Their Relation s 
With the Communis t Part y and the Mosco w Internationals . Ne w York-Boulde r 1988. 
Volksrecht (Aussig) 16 Novembe r 1920. 
For a detailed repor t on the events in Prague , see SÚA, PP 1916-20, sign. D/6/30 , čj. 4431/21 . 
Bohemi a 20 Novembe r 1920. 
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and Brüx (Most ) responde d to th e call for a generá l strike. Th e Marxis t Left mobilize d 
factor y workers in th e capita l who marche d on th e parliamen t buildin g on th e Old 
Town from th e working-clas s suburbs . Th e mos t radica l activitie s too k place in Kladn o 
and Brunn . Mun a led a district-wid e centra l revolutionar y Counci l in Kladn o tha t con -
fiscated local estate s and occupie d th e railroa d stations . Strikin g workers seized th e 
municipa l electri c plan t and waterwork s and halte d public transportatio n in Brunn . 
Th e DSA P leadershi p rejected suppor t for th e generá l strike in its Decembe r mee -
ting, interpretin g th e events in Pragu e as simply an intrapart y struggle over contro l of 
the part y headquarters , a matte r of only local significance in which th e Germa n wor-
king class ough t no t becom e involved. Germa n Social Democrati c leader s supporte d 
neithe r th e part y leadershi p no r th e Marxis t Left in th e strike 2 6. O n th e on e hand , 
DSA P leader s had consistentl y oppose d what the y considere d th e non-social-demo -
crati c coalitio n policie s of th e Czechoslova k Social Democrati c right wing, and con -
demne d its heavy-hande d actions , no t to mentio n th e strong-ar m tactic s of th e police 
tha t led to bloodshed . O n th e othe r hand , th e DSA P stressed th e Marxis t Lefťs lack 
of clear goals, and accused it of absuin g th e weapon of th e generá l strike. Thus , Ger -
ma n suppor t was limite d to Reichenberg , where two-third s of th e Germa n workers 
followed Kreibich , who interprete d th e events in Pragu e as a přelud e to th e revolutio n 
and called for a strike. Th e Reichenber g Organization , breachin g part y disciplině , 
Struc k in suppor t of th e Marxis t Left. O n 14 December , th e governmen t too k forceful 
action , and by 16 December , th e strike was officially over. Civil libertie s were restricte d 
or rescinde d in several districts , includin g Kladno . Th e tol l was 13 dead , scores injured , 
and mor e tha n 3,000 arrested . 
Th e failure of th e governmen t to crack down on th e excesses of th e Czec h nationa -
lists, particularl y th e Legionaires , durin g th e demonstration s in Pragu e two weeks 
earlier had led man y to underestimat e its resolve. Indeed , th e Marxis t Left had inter -
prete d the Czech-Germa n conflic t as a sympto m of social unres t connecte d with th e 
"revolutionar y characte r of th e t ime 2 7 . " Thi s misconceptio n is a partia l explanatio n 
of th e call for a generá l strike by th e weak, fragmented , and unprepare d Marxis t Left, 
which had assumed tha t th e governmen t would be to o feeble to také actio n against i t 2 8 . 
While th e Decembe r generá l strike did no t lead to th e revolutio n hope d for in some 
quarters , it did have mass support : official estimate s place th e numbe r of participant s 
at some 160,00029. Revolutio n in Czechoslovaki a was unlikely , however , because 
while strikers proteste d governmen t policie s and th e action s of some governmen t 
ministers , few oppose d Presiden t Masaryk . As Stivín pu t it, "Ther e are two peopl e ou r 
workers love: Masaryk , ou r President , and Lenin , the Presiden t of the Soviet Russian 
Republic 3 0 ." 
Freihei t (Teplitz ) 12 Decembe r 1920. 
Rudé právo, quote d in Vorwärts (Reichenberg ) 18 Novembe r 1920. 
A detailed Austrian diplomati c repor t places the Prague demonstration s in the wider contex t 
of contemporar y politica l and social Situation : Archiv der Republi k Österreich , Neue s politi-
sches Archiv, carto n 747, fols.491-498. 
Cited in Volksbote (Böhmerwald ) 26 Januar y 1921. 
Quote d in Wh eato n : Radica l Socialism 50. Wheaton cites SÚA, PMV, M 48, cj.6098/20 , 
zn.235-127-9 ; cf. Kocma n et al. (eds.) : Boj osměr2:244 . 
N. M. Wingfield, Working-Class Politics 101 
Th e respons e of th e DSA P leadershi p to th e strike was swift. Th e Reichenber g 
distric t Organizatio n was expelled en masse on 17 Januar y 1921. Thi s actio n left a 
legacy of distrus t in th e Reichenber g area amon g thos e who had remaine d loyal to th e 
Karlsbad Compromis e but had been expelled anyway. Moreover , th e executive 
committe e mad e th e mistak e of literally handin g Kreibic h th e distric t Organizatio n 
with its politica l structur e intact . 
Throughou t the winte r and th e spring of 1921, bot h th e social democrat s and th e 
left-wingers/communist s sent Speaker s to woo th e ran k and filé with differing inter -
pretation s of th e economi c and politica l Situation . Jan Doleža l and Míla Grimichov á 
were particularl y active amon g th e Czech s for th e Marxis t Left. N o town or village in 
th e borde r region s proved to o small for th e ubiquitou s Kreibic h and his Reichenber g 
colleagues, as the y spoke to Germa n workers throughou t Bohemia , Moravia , and 
Silesia. Th e Czechoslova k Social Democrat s launche d a major offensive in early 
Februar y 1921, when part y leader s spoke throughou t Moravi a and Silesia on th e cost 
of living as well as on social revolution . Th e DSA P also sent its Speaker s int o action 3 1. 
Suppor t for th e communist s amon g Czech s and German s living in th e same area 
did no t necessaril y correspond . Fo r example , in Reichenberg , th e stronghol d of th e 
DSA P left wing, th e Czechoslova k Socia l Democrat s backed thei r party' s right 
wing3 2. Moreover , Bolshevik rhetori c could radicaliz e a group of Czec h workers, 
while remainin g unattractiv e to German s in a similar occupation . I t mad e bot h natio -
nalities , however , amon g such traditionall y radica l group s as th e textile workers. 
Social democrati c losses varied regionally , from distric t to distric t (Bezirk; okres) and 
indee d within th e distric t themselves . Th e influenc e of respecte d part y activists -
journalists , local leaders , and trad e unionist s -  appear s to have played a large role . If a 
populä r local figuře left th e social democrati c party , he often too k othe r part y 
member s with him , as in th e čase of Kruma u (Česk ý Krumlov ) in souther n Bohemia . 
When th e Germa n Social Democrati c mayo r Erns t Hirsc h crossed over to th e Com -
munis t Party , he too k with him , in additio n to thre e of th e othe r twelve DSA P city 
Counci l representatives 33 mos t of th e ran k and filé. Kruma u would remai n th e commu -
nist stronghol d in souther n Bohemi a throughou t th e interwa r perio d . 
Loca l circumstance s were also important . While anti-Marxist , th e Czec h miner s of 
the Brüx-Du x (Most-Duchcov ) coalmine s of northwester n Bohemi a shared man y of 
the social aims of th e communists : "Thei r heart s beat for th e revolutio n thoug h thei r 
SÚA, PMR , carto n 3189, sign. 704, Presidiu m ministerstva vnitra [Directorat e of the 
Ministr y of Interior] , 29 Marc h 1921. 
"As concern s the Czech workers, we can not  compar e Reichenber g with Brunn . In Brunn , 
the Czech workers are no longer concerne d with what the party Conferenc e will decide 
[concernin g the demand s of the Marxist Left]; here, the Situatio n is the opposite. " A Cze-
choslovak Social Democra t from Reichenber g quote d in the Volksrecht (Aussig) 6 Septembe r 
1920. -  See also Vorwärts (Reichenberg ) 10 Novembe r 1920. 
See Volksbote (Böhmerwald ) 2 Februar y 1921. 
There was a large drop in suppor t for the DSAP in Kruma u between the 1919 and 1923 
communa l elections . The party went from the second largest (behin d the Joint Germa n list) 
in 1919, to the fourth largest of six partie s (behin d the joint Germa n list, the communists , and 
the joint Czech list). See Volksbote (Böhmerwald ) 29 June 1919 and Trautenaue r Ech o 28 
Septembe r 1923. 
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reason was for th e statě 3 5 . " These men had early com e unde r th e influenc e of anar -
chist s and considere d Communis t Part y disciplin ě anathema . Th e Czec h and Germa n 
Social Democrat s in Brüx bot h supporte d thei r parties ' left wings. Th e Marxis t Left 
and DSA P left voted at a joint meetin g to suppor t th e Decembe r generá l strike and th e 
city was th e scene of violence 36. 
Especiall y in Germa n areas, nationa l as well as economi c and social factor s played a 
role in politica l radicalization . Ther e had been strikes and othe r unres t in Aussig since 
th e war's end 3 7 , and in Decembe r 1918, 6,000 person s demonstrate d in protes t over 
th e occupatio n of Germa n areas of Bohemi a by Czec h troops 3 8 . Th e leader s of th e 
Aussig distric t Organizatio n of th e DSA P were early supporter s of Kreibic h and th e 
part y left wing. Man y of the m later joined th e Czechoslova k Communis t Part y 
(Komunistická strana Československa; th e KSČ) . Th e arrest and deportatio n to Ger -
man y by Czechoslova k statě police s of Marxis t Left sympathize r Rudol f Franke , th e 
edito r of th e DSA P newspaper , Volksrecht, in mid-Septembe r 1920 led to a 24-hou r 
protes t strike in Aussig39. Som e communis t sympath y ther e appear s to have been as 
muc h a protes t against th e Pragu e governmen t and th e DSAP' s lack of effective actio n 
against it, as suppor t for particula r communis t doctrine . 
Sometimes , as in th e western Bohemia n town of Kaade n (Kadaň) , wome n too k th e 
lead in the marc h towar d communism . Johann a Baier, th e wife of a warehous e clerk, 
called a meetin g on 10 April 1921, attende d by abou t 200 people , half of whom were 
women . Th e main topic s of discussion could be called feminist : th e significance of 
Women' s Da y and women' s rights. Th e Organizer s of thi s meetin g believed thei r goals 
coul d be best me t by realizatio n of communis t ideals. Reichenber g activist Ann a 
Joska-Schif f spoke, demandin g equa l rights for wome n in practic e and equa l pay for 
equa l work, as well as seizure of th e home s of th e wealth y and placin g the m at th e 
disposal of "prolific proletaria n families 40." 
Beginnin g in Januar y 1921, Kreibic h tried to pressure th e Marxis t Left int o formin g 
a communis t party , sometime s polemicizin g as muc h against Šmera l as against th e 
"opportunists " in th e DSAP . H e attacke d th e Marxis t Left for failing to accep t Lenin' s 
21 Point s and to join th e Thir d Internationa l at its Conferenc e earlier tha t month , 
durin g which it was decide d to delay consideratio n of th e issue unti l Ma y to give local 
organization s a chanc e to discuss it. Kreibic h asserted tha t th e delay was actuall y due 
W h e a t o n : Radica l Socialism 53. 
Freihei t (Teplitz ) 15 Decembe r 1920. 
"In some cities, there was regrettabl e lootin g as on 2 Novembe r 1918 in Aussig, where a 
crowd of people ransacke d the Bergestelle [a warehouse ] with its huge störe of shoes, fürs, 
leather , uniforms , and clothin g . . . " L u g, Viktor: Die Stadt Reichenber g im Weltkriege. 
Reichenber g 1930, 74. 
Bohemi a 6 Decembe r 1918. 
See Volksrecht (Aussig) 21 Septembe r -  16 Octobe r 1920. -  The Czechoslova k Communis t 
historia n Pau l [Pavel] Reiman n considere d tha t worker reactio n to the expulsion of Frank e 
marked the poin t at which worker protes t became political . See his Geschicht e der Kommu -
nistischen Parte i der Tschechoslowakei . Hambur g 1931; reprinted. : Munic h 1975. 
SÚA, PMR , carto n 3189, no.704 , Okresn í správa politická v Kadan i [Distric t Politica l 
Administratio n in Kaaden] , 12 April 1921. 
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to description s of communis m as an enem y of th e Czechoslova k statě in th e 
"bourgeois-patrioti c press, " which mad e th e Marxis t Left apprehensiv e abou t takin g 
decisive action . Czec h revolutionar y ardo r had in fact coole d in th e aftermat h of th e 
generá l strike. 
In Marc h 1921, Kreibic h forme d th e Germa n section of th e Communis t Part y of 
Czechoslovakia . Thi s small, discipline d Organizatio n attempte d to force Smeral' s 
group to th e left and the n unit ě with it. Šmeral , movin g within a larger politica l milieu 
tha n Kreibich , continue d to work to win as man y Czechoslova k Socia l Democrat s as 
possible to his poin t of view, leadin g Kreibic h to accuse th e Marxis t Left of harborin g 
centrist s and opportunists . Th e Marxis t Left, a far larger, mor e mixed , and less radica l 
group tha n Kreibich's , probabl y did includ e "centrists. " Ther e were several reason s 
for Smeral' s behavior . First , althoug h his politica l ideas were evolving, he hesitate d to 
place his Organizatio n in th e hand s of th e Comintern . Second , th e leader s of th e 
Marxis t Left felt less interna l pressure tha n did th e DSA P left wing to form anothe r 
politica l part y quickly, because it was alread y a separat e Organization . No r did th e 
Marxis t Left need th e suppor t of th e Germa n Communist s to be an effective politica l 
force. Thi s is no t to imply, however , tha t Šmera l was immun e to th e pressure exerted 
by the diverse member s of th e Marxis t Left, or th e small, independen t communis t 
partie s clamorin g for Cominter n recognition , and by Mosco w itself, for he was not . 
Finally , his trad e unio n colleagues did no t want to move so fast as to alienat e thei r 
own, sometime , mor e conservative , supporters . 
At its Conferenc e in mid-Ma y 1921, th e Marxis t Left voted to form a communis t 
part y an d join th e Thir d International . Šmera l rejected Kreibich' s deman d for imme -
diate uni f icatio n of th e Czec h and Germa n wings of th e part y because of nationa l sen-
sitivities. H e also cautione d Kreibic h no t to be too zealou s in his calls for purificatio n 
of th e party . Disagreement s between th e two continue d unti l th e Thir d Congres s of 
th e Communis t Internationa l in late June . Leni n himsel f attempte d to solve th e 
Czechoslova k question , calling for th e unificatio n to th e two section s of th e party . H e 
advised Šmera l to také two steps to th e left and Kreibic h on e step to th e right in orde r 
to form a unified Czechoslova k Communis t Party 4 1 . 
At th e Thir d Congress , th e Czechoslova k and Germa n Communis t Partie s were 
instructe d to form a Committe e of Six to coordinat e th e formatio n of a single party , 
but unificatio n was mor e easily děmande d tha n achieved . Ther e were still difference s 
of opinio n amon g th e Communist s of different nationalities , particularl y between th e 
Czech s and Germans . Man y Czec h Communist s remaine d wary of thei r Germa n 
comrades , whom Šmera l characterize d as "aggressive and as having a taste for leader -
ship 4 2 . " 
Nationa l tension s continue d to afflict th e Czec h and Germa n communist s up to th e 
foundatio n of a unified party . Th e initia l draft of part y Statute s by th e Czech-Germa n 
committe e envisione d bridging th e two partie s throug h a joint centra l committee . 
After Moscow' s sharp criticism thi s pian , anothe r draft , muc h influence d by Moscow , 
Rudé právo 17July 1921. 
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which called for a completel y unite d and strongly centralize d party , was adopted , no t 
withou t infighting , at th e foundin g part y congres s in Novembe r 19214 3. 
Czechoslova k Social Democrati c losses to th e Communist s were quickly apparent , 
because th e left wing had been well represente d in parliament . Losses were muc h smal-
ler amon g th e DSA P deputie s and Senators , amon g whom th e left had been weak. KSČ 
membershi p was initiall y large: estimate s for mid-192 1 vary between 350,000 and 
400,000 44, includin g 41,054 Germa n dues-payin g members , 9,200 of whom were 
female 45. Th e attractivenes s of th e Czechoslova k Communis t Party , which had supp -
or t in bot h rura l and urba n areas as well as a supranationa l appeal , becam e clear with 
th e result s of th e communa l election s of 1923 and was confirme d by th e 1925 parlia -
mentar y elections . Th e Czechoslova k Communis t Part y attracte d abou t on e half of 
th e Czechoslova k Socia l Democrati c constituenc y and abou t a thir d of th e Germa n 
Social Democrati c Party' s membership , while decimatin g th e Ruthenia n and Slovák 
branche s of th e Organization . 
Man y Germa n Social Democrat s viewed th e division of th e Czechoslova k Social 
Democrati c Part y as th e reasonabl e result of rank-and-fil e Oppositio n to what the y 
considere d th e non-social-democrati c behavio r of th e right wing. Initially , part y 
leader s did no t equat e th e Marxis t Left with th e Bolsheviks, correctl y arguin g tha t 
thei r pplitic s were neithe r entirel y free of th e chauvinis m of th e Czechoslova k Social 
Democrati c right no r mor e radica l tha n thos e of left-win g social democrat s elsewhere . 
Germa n Social Democrat s viewed th e division within thei r own part y differently , as 
an attemp t by renegad e part y member s unde r th e influenc e of Mosco w to destro y th e 
DSA P from within and the n construc t a communis t party . Like th e Czechs , th e 
Germa n Social Democrat s were pressure d from th e right . Indeed , DSA P electora l 
losses after 1921 were far mor e often to partie s of th e right tha n to th e communists , 
because th e Germa n worker , recognizin g "tha t th e internationa l partie s can brin g him 
neithe r nationa l no r economi c help , due to th e chauvinis m of th e Czechs , has turne d 
his back on th e Marxis t partie s altogether 4 6." Appreciatin g th e attractivenes s of othe r 
parties ' nationalis t appeal s to thei r constituency , th e Germa n Social Democrat s were 
reluctan t to seek closer ties with th e Czechoslova k Social  Democrats , who were in any 
čase unsympatheti c to Germa n nationa l aspirations . Nationa l autonom y remaine d th e 
primar y issue on the Germa n Socia l Democrati c politica l agenda , and th e German s in 
th e Czechoslova k Communis t Part y accused th e DSA P leadershi p of having followed 
an essentially national , no t to say . . . nationalist , policy from th e tim e of th e division 
of th e party 4 7 . 
Th e rum p Czechoslova k Socia l Democrati c Party , influence d by th e Czechoslova k 
Nationa l Socialist Party , moved furthe r to th e right , participatin g in t he increasingl y 
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sources, but argues tha t it is too high. See his study Communis t Stratégy and Tactic s in 
Czechoslovakia , 1918-1948. Londo n 1963, 60. 
AÚM L ÚV KSČ, sb 2, inv. no . 18, fol. 11. 
Bohemi a 18 Septembe r 1923. 
AÚM L ÚV KSČ, sb 2, inv. no . 18, fol. 11. 
N. M. Wingfield, Working-Class Politics 105 
moderat e all-nationa l coalitio n unti l 1926. Although additiona l social reform s were 
legislated, th e party' s losses prevente d it from playing a decisive role in th e govern-
ment . Nothin g in the politica l Situatio n encourage d th e Czechoslova k Social Demo -
crat s to seek closer ties with th e Germa n Social Democrats , as lon g as the y persisted in 
thei r demand s for nationa l autonomy . Cooperatio n with th e DSA P would have 
gained th e Czechoslova k Social Democrat s few supporter s from th e politica l left so 
long as the y remaine d in th e coalition , and would have alienate d th e party' s nationalis t 
majority . 
Although some Czechoslova k Communis t leaders , includin g Šmeral , were clearly 
attune d to th e nationalis t concern s of th e ran k and filé, these question s soon too k a 
back seat on th e communis t politica l agenda . Mosco w increasingl y dominate d th e 
party , first with its Bolshevizatio n durin g th e 1920s, and later with its Stalinization . 
Mos t of th e origina l leader s of the KSČ , forme r social democrat s sensitive to th e parti -
cular ethni c problem s of th e workin g class of Czechoslovakia , were replace d by men 
strictl y loyal to th e Mosco w line. Th e KSČ paid th e price for Soviet domination : 
factiona l strife and purges insure d tha t it, th e largest working-clas s part y in th e coun -
try durin g the early 1920s, becam e little mor e tha n a Stalinis t séct by the early 1930s48. 
Moreover , failure to addres s adequatel y the demand s of the nationa l minoritie s mean t 
tha t rank-and-fil e Germa n Communist s were only a little mor e immun e to the attrac -
tion of Konrá d Henlei n and th e Sudete n Germa n Part y tha n were th e German s of th e 
othe r politica l parties , as th e election s of 1935 and 1938 would reveal 49. 
As with othe r politica l parties in Czechoslovakia , there was a large disparity between the 
numbe r of KSČ members , which Zinne r claims nevěr exceeded 1/3 million , and was only that 
high initially, and the much higher numbe r of people who voted for the KSČ. The numbe r of 
supporter s was relatively stable at 3/4 million . See Communis t Stratégy. 
In the 1935 parliamentar y elections , the Sudeten Germa n Part y (SdP) received 1,249,530 
votes, two-thirdso f all of the votes cast for Germa n politica l parties and more than 15.2% of 
the entir e vote. The SdP gained about 85% of the entir e Germa n vote in the 1938 municipa l 
elections . 
